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The Crossroads of Russian Federalism 
By VLADIMIR YEMELYANENKO
Moscow News
Since the system of local soviets was abolished in 1993, the power struggle between 
the Kremlin and the Russian provinces on one hand, and the local executive and 
legislative branches on the other, can be characterized as open conflict, occasionally 
interrupted by armed neutrality.
Issues concerning the rights of the "Federation Subjects" (Russia's 89 provinces and 
republics) emerged five years ago. The reasons for complicated interactions between 
the organs of state power are to be found in President Boris Yel'tsin's federal policy. Its 
direction was formulated in 1991 when the president stated that "every Subject of the 
Federation will try to assume as much sovereignty as it can." In a short period of time, 
the national-territorial entities, the republics, acquired some attributes of sovereignty 
after signing treaties concerning delimitation of power with the Kremlin. The republics 
managed to obtain agreements under which their contributions to the federal budget 
were lowered. As a result, 21 republics, 12 of which are subsidized by the center (e.g., 
90 percent of Ingushetia's budget comes from federal subsidies, 92 percent in the case 
of the Adygei republic, while Komi and Karelia are subsidized to the tune of some 52 
percent), were granted economic privileges at the expense of the rest of the 68 Russian 
territorial-administrative formations such as krais, oblasts, and okrugs .(1)
Since then, the largest Russian regions, (Sverdlovsk oblast', which is economically 
more powerful than the republic of Tatarstan, Leningrad Oblast', (2) Maritime and 
Krasnodar krais, the five regions of Siberia,(3) and Kaliningrad oblast') have embarked 
on a permanent struggle for economic equity with the republics. Between 1993 and 
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1994 the regions lost the first battle. This was a period of regional separatism, when the 
oblasts were trying to consolidate into republics following the Tatarstan, Chechnya, or 
Yakutia models. The proclamation of Ural, Siberian, and Far Eastern republics was a 
provocative move vis-a-vis the Kremlin. However, these amorphous entities, with a 
mere paper legitimacy, had a single objective -- redistribution of the federal budget.
Under these circumstances, Moscow initiated treaties on delimitation of power with 
individual administrative entities, marking a new stage in the struggle of krais and oblast 
for equal rights with the republics. In 1995 the federal government signed a treaty "On 
Delimitation of Power With Orenburg Oblast'." Subsequently, in January 1996, similar 
treaties were signed between the Kremlin and Sverdlovsk, as well as between the 
center and Kaliningrad. The difference in status between these oblasts and the 
republics was narrowed, and it was clear that the government had provided the basis for 
favoritism in its federal policy. The preferential treatment Orenburg and Sverdlovsk 
received was not accidental: Orenburg and Sverdlovsk, respectively, are Prime Minister 
Viktor Chernomyrdin's and President Yel'tsin's hometowns. The establishment of direct 
bilateral relations between the Kremlin and Sverdlovsk encouraged the Far East, 
Tyumen, Krasnodar, and Kuzbass to solicit for special status.
There is no doubt that certain regions should be granted prerogatives: the isolated 
enclave location of Kaliningrad and the territorial remoteness of the Far Eastern 
Maritime province dictate a different level of relations with the center than the "inner" 
regions. It is easier for Kaliningrad to maintain trade relations with neighboring Poland, 
Lithuania or Scandinavia, and it is more sensible for the Far Eastern Maritime region to 
trade with China, Japan, and Korea, than for either to deal with Central Russia. Tyumen 
is also insisting on a special status, since it provides 69 percent of Russia's oil 
production, but is allowed to use the profits of only one percent. Today Moscow views 
the signing of bilateral treaties with the leading regions as a continuation of the trend 
started with the republics.
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Federation Council experts analyzed the treaties on delimitation of power that were 
signed with Yakutia and Tatarstan and concluded that, initially, the preferential treatment 
in taxation allowed these republics to maintain lower prices in comparison with the 
neighboring regions. However, as these analysts discovered, eventually such a policy 
resulted in the disappearance of some products and price increases of others. 
According to the experts, such an outcome, stimulated by the Kremlin, is resulting in a 
type of economic separatism. A similar tendency in Orenburg and Sverdlovsk 
demonstrated the futility of the federal center trying to appease the largest and most 
developed Subjects of the Federation. In other words, delimitation of powers in bilateral 
agreements inevitably entails recarving the federal budget, which is doomed to become 
leaner with more regions in line for a piece of the federal pie.
It is clear that the "special relations" and "bilateral agreements" between the regions and 
the center have only a symbolic character. The best solution, according to the former 
Minister on Nationality Issues, Valeri Tishkov, derives not from "special status," but from 
"regionalization," in other words, the unification of oblasts, krais, and republics into 
economic groups. For example, Bashkortostan, Sverdlovsk, Perm, Orenburg could unify 
into a large Ural region; the Siberian krais, oblasts and national entities into a Siberia 
region, etc. In proposing this model Tishkov suggests a departure from ethnic territorial 
entities as distinct economic areas. His idea is supported by the governors of Nizhny 
Novgorod (Boris Nemtsov) and Orel (Egor Stroev). However, the presidents of the 
ethnic republics do not welcome this idea.
The Kremlin, so far, is aiming to preserve the status quo, while giving favorite treatment 
to certain regions. At the same time, the central government is trying to preserve 
maximum control over all Federation Subjects. The roots of such a policy are seen in 
Moscow's interference in the balance of power between the two branches of regional 
power. It is clear that elections have become an effective tool for the center to 
manipulate the regions. According to federal law, the heads of local administrations (i.e., 
the governors), and the chairmen of regional parliaments, soviets, or zemstvos (4)(the 
representative branch) should be elected to office.
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The results of such a supposedly democratic system were demonstrated on December 
17, 1995, when elections to the Federal Duma coincided with gubernatorial elections in 
12 Russian regions. Yel'tsin succeeded again in placing "his" people in the periphery.
The gubernatorial elections were conducted in the absence of electoral law and were 
based instead on a 1993 presidential edict. In 1993, under a similar edict, an 
experimental set of elections was conducted in nine regions. As a result, the newly 
elected local executives, (representing a typical Yel'tsin electorate in cities like 
Yekaterinburg, Moscow, St. Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Krasnoyarsk, and Irkutsk) 
usurped all functions of power. The distribution of power became even more uneven 
after the legislative functions of the local soviets were deprived of substance. In a period 
of two years regional legislatures gradually lost their authority, which was transferred 
into the hands of the governors.
These heads of administration became enamored with their widened "responsibilities," 
performing executive and legislative tasks at the same time. Since 1993, both chambers 
of the Russian parliament have considered four versions of electoral law for 
gubernatorial elections. Each met its demise in the Duma over the issue of defining the 
limits of executive power. In the contest between the branches the 17 December 1995 
elections mark yet another victory for the executive. In general, the results are also to 
Moscow's advantage; incumbents, who were originally appointed by Yel'tsin, won in 
nine of the 12 regions holding gubernatorial elections. Moreover, these regions had 
substantially higher voter participation; with 60% to 70% turnout in regions holding 
simultaneous gubernatorial elections as compared to 58% to 62% in other parts of 
Russia. The nine incumbent victors confirm the formation of a vertical flow of power, 
from a powerful executive to a legislature dependent upon him.
Only three regions elected new governors; a communist in Novosibirsk and two former 
party apparatchiks in Tambov and Tver. This development should not be viewed as 
simply a restoration of the nomenklatura. Rather, it poses a more complicated problem; 
namely, that communists candidates were victorious in precisely those regions where 
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the legislative branch was completely trampled by the executive. Over the last couple of 
years, not a single piece of legislation enacted by the regional parliament has been 
signed into law in Tambov and Novosibirsk.
This "cold war" between the branches illuminates a rather interesting alliance; 
nowadays, former CPSU obkom secretaries do not rely solely on fellow communists. 
They have found new partners among the motley composition of the powerless 
legislative branch. "Offended" and "discouraged," local legislative representatives, either 
Communists, members of the Congress of Russian Communities or representatives of 
Zhirinovsky's LDPR, nominated gubernatorial candidates in all 12 regions. A month after 
the elections in Tver, Novosibirsk, and Tambov, where the united opposition proved 
victorious, the rival branches have declared a truce.
This truce is an unwelcome development for Moscow, which has lost its levers in the 
periphery. The democratic parties originated in the capital and have little influence or 
organizational strength outside Moscow. The Communist party, on the other hand, is the 
only party which maintained and developed its infrastructure in the provinces. With this 
strategic disadvantage in mind, Moscow based the elections on a presidential edict 
rather than electoral law and forbade the most unreliable regions to hold elections. Such 
as Kuzbass, where 51 percent of the electorate voted for the Communists in the federal 
elections; Chita, where none of the laws of the local Duma was approved by the head of 
their administration; Volgograd, where the local soviet is constantly demanding the 
resignation of the governor; and Saratov, where the oblast ' Duma is in conflict with the 
city mayor. For four years all of these regions have been demanding the right to hold 
gubernatorial elections. If the new Duma passes legislation concerning gubernatorial 
elections, a return of the far left-leaning legislatures is predestined.
In this context, Yel'tsin recently stated that those regions which had been forbidden to 
hold elections in December would be allowed to hold gubernatorial elections this spring. 
Such a move would constitute a serious challenge by Moscow to the rebellious regional 
elites. The Kremlin is giving assurances that such elections will not be held on the basis 
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of a presidential edict, but in accordance with a to-be-adopted new law. If such 
legislation is passed by the Duma and signed by the president, it would reflect 
Moscow's new political course toward the regions, i.e., a shift from authoritarianism to 
real federalism. However, this policy also reveals a paradox; more federalism will 
legitimize the domination of Communists in the political life of the regions.
Notes:
1. Republic -- territory with a non-Russian titular nationality; Krai --large region which 
contains smaller ethnic territorial formations, such as okrugs; Oblast' -- administrative 
entity without specific ethnic characteristics; Okrug - subdivision of a krai or oblast' -- 
Ed. 
2. Although the city of Leningrad was renamed St. Petersburg, the name of the oblast' 
remains unchanged. -- Ed. 
3. Omsk, Novosibirsk, Tomsk, Chitinsk oblasts, and Krasnodar Krai. --Ed.
4. Zemstvo -- elected district council in pre-revolutionary Russia (the name has been re-
adopted today) --Ed.
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